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Inequality and Inequity in the Emergence of Conventions
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Many societies have norms of equity—that those who make symmetric social
contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread
patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often
the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per
contribution than others. In this paper, we draw on evolutionary game theory
to show that the emergence of this sort of convention is far from surprising. In
simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much more likely to emerge
than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups
might instead learn. As we outline, social groups provide a way to break
symmetry between actors in determining both contribution and reward in
joint projects.
1 Introduction
It has been widely observed that cross-culturally women tend to do more overall work
supporting households, and tend to have less free time, than men do (Coltrane, 2000;
Bianchi et al., 2006; Treas and Drobnic, 2010). Despite this, women are poorer, on
average, than men even in highly developed nations (Casper et al., 1994; Pressman,
2002). When it comes to collaborative research in science, it also seems to be the case
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that in some disciplines women’s contributions to the production of research are under-
compensated. They get less credit for collaborative projects than men do, even when
doing a large portion of work (West et al., 2013; Sugimoto, 2013; Feldon et al., 2017).
These are examples of inequality in the sense that the division of social resources
favors those in one social group. They are also examples of inequity, by which we
mean that symmetric contributions to a social good are not met with symmetric re-
wards. Women garner less economic compensation per hour contributed to household
production. Women get less academic credit per time spent on scientific research. These
observations are perhaps surprising given the widespread acceptance of social norms
supporting equity (Adams and Freedman, 1976; Freedman and Montanari, 1980).1 One
question we might ask is: despite explicit endorsement for equitable reward structures,
what sorts of social processes might lead to inequitable ones?
Previous authors have used evolutionary game theoretic models to help illuminate
how inherently unequal conventions can emerge between social groups.2 In particular,
these models show that when societies are divided into social categories (men and women,
black and white people, Christians and Muslims) the dynamics of social learning and
cultural evolution can lead to unequal divisions of resources for no particular reason.3
In other words, in these models completely identical groups with an option to divide
resources equally often end up doing it unequally simply as a result of their different
group memberships.
In this paper, we look to explore not the emergence of inequality, but the emergence
of inequity. We ask: can these sorts of simple cultural dynamics drive groups to reward
1Starting with Adams (1963), equity theory—which posits that in many societies people find inequity
highly unpleasant and seek to minimize it—has had many explanatory successes. See Van den Bos (2001)
for an overview.
2See, for example, Axtell et al. (2000); Poza et al. (2011); Gallo (2014); Bruner (2017); Bruner and
O’Connor (2015); O’Connor and Bruner (2017); Rubin and O’Connor (2017); O’Connor (2017a).
3To be clear, we are not making any claims here about the similarities of these various social
categories—race is not the same as gender is not the same as religious affiliation. This said, the highly
simplified models we will explore here capture broad, general aspects of social categories, and so can be
applied to various cases.
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labor inequitably on the basis of meaningless social identities? To address this question,
we introduce a game where actors first produce some social good, and where their con-
tributions to this production may vary. They then must divide the products of their
joint labor. We model the emergence of conventions to regulate this sort of interaction
in a group with social categories like gender or race.
These models allow us to pull apart unequal conventions from inequitable ones.
Outcomes where two groups receive unequal levels of resource may be equitable if one side
did more work in the first place. Outcomes where the two groups receive equal resources
may be inequitable if one side did more work. We find that there are many stable
outcomes where members of one group do more work per level of compensation. In other
words, explicit inequity can emerge via cultural evolution under very minimal conditions,
even between groups that are completely identical in terms of skills, preferences, etc. In
fact, in most models we investigate, we find that inequity is the much more likely outcome
than equity.
Notably, this is the case even when we give actors the ability to condition their
demands for compensation based on the contributions made by their partners in joint
labor. Our model is the first of this sort to admit this possibility. But, as we show,
the ability to condition demands in this way does little to ameliorate the emergence of
inequity. The take-away is that, despite stated norms of equity, outcomes like those
described above, where members of one social group receive inequitable rewards for
labor, should be expected to arise under minimal conditions from simple dynamics of
social interaction.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 we introduce the main models that
will be used in this paper—variations on the Nash bargaining game that involve a pro-
duction stage and a division of resources stage. We also describe previous results on the
emergence of unequal conventions in models of the evolution of bargaining. In sections
3 and 4 we describe the main results of the paper. These two sections consider models
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where individuals do and do not condition their demands for compensation based on the
level of work done by their interactive partners. As we will elaborate, both variations
allow for the robust emergence of inequitable conventions. In addition, as we outline,
these results are robust across various modeling choices. In section 5 we conclude.
2 The Bargaining Game and the Produce and Partition Game
The Nash demand game was introduced by Nash (1950) to represent scenarios where
two individuals divide a resource (money, goods, free time), where there are different
plausible divisions that are more or less preferable to each of the actors, and where
highly aggressive individuals will fail to successfully agree on a division. In representing
divisions of social resources, we will start with a simplified version of his model, a ‘mini-
game’, that captures these features, and is computationally tractable.4
Suppose two actors divide a resource of value 10, and each can make a low, medium,
or high demand, corresponding to a request for 4, 5, or 6 units of the good. Further
suppose that if these requests are compatible, each actor gets what they ask for. If
they over-demand the resource, though, each gets a low payoff, sometimes called the
disagreement point, of 0. The payoff table of this game is pictured in figure 1. Rows
represent the possible demands for player 1, and columns for player 2, while entries to
the table list what payoffs each player gets for some combination of demands.
This game has three Nash equilibria.5 This solution concept refers to sets of strategies
where no actors can change behaviors and improve their payoff. For this reason, Nash
equilibria tend to be stable in the sense that no one is incentivized to change. As we
will see they also tend to be the endpoints of evolutionary processes. These equilibria
4See Sigmund et al. (2001) for more on the mini-game approach. There is a long tradition of using
mini versions of the bargaining game in evolutionary models (Young, 1993b; Skyrms, 1994). The full
models here involve a mini Nash demand game of this sort embedded in a larger game where actors first
produce the resource via another mini Nash demand game.
5We will only worry about pure strategy Nash equilibria in this paper since they are the only equilibria
relevant to evolutionary dynamics in this case.
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Figure 1: Payoff table for a mini Nash demand game.
are the strategy pairings where the actors perfectly divide the resource: Low vs. High,
Med vs. Med, or High vs. Low. At these pairings, an actor who changes to demand less
simply gets less, while one who tries demanding more over-demands the resource and
gets nothing.
Now imagine a model where actors in a society play this game with each other re-
peatedly, and where these actors belong to two different social identity groups. Suppose
that they are able to choose how aggressively to bargain based on the identity group
membership of each partner they encounter. (For example, a latinx person might choose
medium demands with other latinx people, but low demands when meeting white peo-
ple.) Further suppose that over time, this group culturally evolves—individuals update
their behaviors in ways that benefit themselves, so that, eventually, some stable pattern
of group behavior emerges. This model might represent actors of two different races
learning how to bargain over salary in the workforce, or men and women developing
conventions to divide household labor.6
Under many dynamics—rules that model cultural change or learning—there are three
outcomes that tend to emerge between groups in this sort of model, corresponding to
the three equilibria. Either group A demands High and B Low, or they make medium
6As noted, social categories, like gender and race, are importantly different from each other, and
the processes that govern interactions between these categories will be very different as well. We are
working within a tradition of social modeling that privileges simplicity, tractability, and causal clarity
over realism. (See Weisberg (2012) for an analysis of the trade-offs between these various modeling
virtues.) This allows us to illustrate minimal conditions for the emergence of inequitable conventions in
the sense outlined by O’Connor (2017c). It also allows us to apply the same models to social processes
that may have different details, as long as we understand this application to be a course grained one.
5
demands, or group A demands Low and B High. Notice that one of these outcomes looks
something like a ‘fair’ convention of bargaining, and the other two are discriminatory in
the sense that individuals treat in- and out-group members differently to the detriment
of one out-group. Indeed, starting with Axtell et al. (2000), this sort of model has
been used as a bare bones representation of the emergence of discrimination and of
inequality between groups.7 The remarkable thing about this model is that we see
inequality emerge endogenously among actors who simply engage in reasonable learning
given their environments. This is despite any sort of justifying asymmetry between the
groups in terms of skills, preferences, or starting conditions, and without any assumptions
about biases, stereotypes, or the psychology of in-group/out-group interaction. Follow
up results have demonstrated the robustness of this emergence of inequality to modeling
choices, and have proven the flexibility of this framework to illuminate issues surrounding
inequality (Poza et al., 2011; Gallo, 2014; Bruner, 2017; O’Connor and Bruner, 2017;
Rubin and O’Connor, 2017).
A suggestion raised by Wagner (2012) is that the simplified Nash demand game
can, with slight modifications, be taken to represent a situation where actors do not
divide a windfall resource, but instead divide the fruits of joint labor. In particular,
Wagner suggests that a combination of the stag hunt game (where actors choose between
mutually beneficial, but risky, joint action, and risk-free solo production) and the Nash
demand game can represent a case where two actors first decide whether to produce a
good together and then decide who gets how much of it.8
The game we explore in this paper is similar to the stag hunt/Nash demand game, but
adds the feature that actors can make differential contributions to the jointly produced
good, rather than just deciding to opt in or opt out of it. We’ll call this the produce and
7Their model is very similar to those introduced by Young (1993a,b).
8O’Connor and Bruner (2017) explore the emergence of unequal conventions between groups in this
stag hunt/Nash demand combo, which they call ’the collaboration game’. Inequality emerges endoge-
nously in this model, and is particularly likely when actors have low payoffs for hare hunting, or solo
work.
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partition game. We suppose that actors first play a Nash demand game to divide labor.
We might think of the resource as representing free time, or time away from the joint
product which can be used for personal gain. An aggressive demand, then, is a demand
for a small amount of labor, while an accommodating demand represents a willingness
to make a large contribution to the good produced. If actors reach the disagreement
point in this part of the game, their project fails. They did not jointly contribute enough
time to succeed. This choice assumes that the good is either produced or not, rather
than varying in benefit based on the level of contribution as in, for example, a public
goods game. While this is a simplifying assumption, it also corresponds to many realistic
scenarios. In an actual stag hunt, for example, you either get the stag or you do not.
In many work collaborations, you either land the big client or you don’t.9 This said,
one natural extension to the work we present here is to models where greater levels of
contribution correspond to a more valuable good.
If actors do enough labor to produce a good, they then have to decide how to divvy
it out. This is done via a second round of the Nash demand game where the demands
are now for an amount of the resource produced. Payoffs for the entire interaction then
represent a combination of preferences for less work/external work in stage one and more
reward in stage two.10 Notice that even actors who do not produce a good get some
payoff, from lazing around in stage one, or else from using their extra time to produce
solo payoffs.
To be concrete, assume there are three levels of contribution in the first stage: Shirk,
Work, and Toil. These represent small, medium, and large effort levels, respectively.
Because actors are dividing labor, shirk is the aggressive demand, and generates a payoff
9For other cases, there are levels of contribution below which essentially no payoff is generated and
above which extra effort produces small differences. In building a house, the amount of effort which
makes it livable creates a large payoff, and extra effort to improve the dwelling will generate smaller
surpluses. A model like the one just described is a decent match to such scenarios.
10To our knowledge, this kind of two-part bargaining game has never appeared in the literature before
as a model for equity (evolutionary or otherwise). The closest replication might be Kazemi et al. (2017)
in which participants produced a public good which could be divided unevenly. This split was determined
unilaterally by a predetermined leader, however, and not via a bargaining game.
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of 6. Work and Toil contributions generate payoffs of 5, and 4, respectively. The players
fail to complete the project if both players shirk, or if one shirks and the other works.
Otherwise they invest enough for the joint project to reach completion—generating a
resource of value 10. At this point, they each make a Low, Medium, or High demand (for
4, 5, or 6) of this resource. If their demands sum to 10 or less, then the payoff for each
player is the sum of their effort payoff and their demand. Otherwise, the agents cannot
agree on how the resource should be split, and each walks away with only their effort
payoff. Each player then has nine distinct (Contribution, Demand) strategies: (Shirk,L),
(Shirk,M), (Shirk,H), (Work,L), (Work,M), (Work,H), (Toil,L), (Toil,M), and (Toil,H).
Figure 2 gives the payoff table for two individuals playing produce and partition.
Shirk, L Shirk, M Shirk, H Work, L Work, M Work, H Toil, L Toil, M Toil, H
6, 6 6, 6 6, 6 6, 5 6, 5 6, 5 10, 8 10, 9 10, 10
6, 6 6, 6 6, 6 6, 5 6, 5 6, 5 11, 8 11, 9 6, 4
6, 6 6, 6 6, 6 6, 5 6, 5 6, 5 12, 8 6, 4 6, 4
5, 6 5, 6 5, 6 9, 9 9, 10 9, 11 9, 8 9, 9 9, 10
5, 6 5, 6 5, 6 10, 9 10, 10 5, 5 10, 8 10, 9 5, 4
5, 6 5, 6 5, 6 11, 9 5, 5 5, 5 11, 8 5, 4 5, 4
8, 10 8, 11 8, 12 8, 9 8, 10 8, 11 8, 8 8, 9 8, 10
9, 10 9, 11 4, 6 9, 9 9, 10 4, 5 9, 8 9, 9 4, 4
Shirk, L
Shirk, M
Shirk, H
Work, L
Work, M
Work, H
Toil, L
Toil, M
10, 10 4, 6 4, 6 10, 9 4, 5 4, 5 10, 8 4, 4 4, 4Toil, H
Player 2
Player 1
Figure 2: Payoff table for produce and partition.
In the basic Nash demand game, the equilibria are the strategy profiles where players
divide the resource without waste. Given that produce and partition is akin to two
Nash demand games strung together, one might expect its Nash equilibria to be the
strategy sets where the two resources (effort and reward) are divided efficiently. This
intuition turns out to be correct in many cases. The structure of the game is such
that given another player’s work contribution, the best response usually involves doing
just enough work to complete the project (e.g., choosing Shirk when the other player
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chooses Toil).11 And once a project is completed, a player does best to match their
expectations for compensation to the demand of their partner. The Nash equilibria
for produce and partition are then the strategy pairs which waste neither effort nor
any of the produced good: (Shirk,M)/(Toil,M), (Shirk,L)/(Toil,H), (Shirk,H)/(Toil,L),
(Work,L)/(Work,H), and (Work,M)/(Work,M), and all the flipped versions of these.
(I.e., both (Shirk,M)/(Toil,M) and (Toil,M)/(Shirk,M) are equilibria. In the first, player
1 gets a preferable outcome, and in the second player 2 does. From an equity standpoint,
they are equivalent.) The payoffs for these equilibria are bolded in figure 2.
As we will see, these equilibria will be the endpoints of our evolutionary models,
meaning that they represent the possible, stable social arrangements between social
groups. We can take these as representations of social conventions—stable patterns of
behavior which might have been otherwise, but which each actor will prefer to adhere
to given that the rest of the group does.12 Axtell et al. (2000) refer to such patterns of
behavior in similar models as norms, though typical accounts of norms require actors
to believe that a pattern of behavior ought to be followed. This sort of belief is not
captured in these simple models.
Before moving on, we would like to pull out in more detail the characters of these
various possible conventions. In the first three types of equilibria, ((Shirk,M)/(Toil,M),
(Shirk,L)/(Toil,H), and (Shirk,H)/(Toil,L)), one group is systematically bearing more of
the work. In the middle three ((Shirk,L)/(Toil,H), (Shirk,H)/(Toil,L), and (Work,L)/(Work,H)),
one group is consistently taking home more of the spoils. These unequal partitions of
labor and rewards might be tolerable if they are at least equitable, however. Most aca-
demics, for instance, would agree that if one co-author does more work than the other,
then he deserves the more prestigious author position. This scenario might be captured
11An exception to this occurs when a player expects such a low payoff from later bargaining that they
do better to just slack off in round one and never complete the project at all. We will return to this
possibility later.
12For more on the use of games to represent conventions, see Lewis (1969). See O’Connor (2017b) for
more on using bargaining games to illustrate inequitable and unequal conventions in particular.
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by equilibrium (Shirk,L)/(Toil,H), where one group consistently invests and reaps less
and the other invests and reaps more. While such an equilibrium is unequal in the sense
that one group earns less, it is at least equitable. This and the (Work,M)/(Work,M) equi-
librium are actually the only equitable outcomes. The equilibrium (Work,L)/(Work,H),
for instance, resembles the plight of women described in the introduction: equal work
reaps unequal reward. Anyone who has participated in a group project at school is
familiar with (Shirk,M)/(Toil,M): industrious students put forth more effort than lazy
ones, but all group members receive the same grade. Finally, (Shirk,H)/(Toil,L) is the
most inequitable of these conventions, with one party working hard to receive little pay
and the other barely working to obtain a fortune. One might imagine this is the relation
some CEO’s have with their employees.
So we see that this game has equilibria that are inequitable in two different ways—
actors work equally hard to different rewards, or actors make different contributions
to equal rewards (or even to unequal rewards that do not correspond to their levels
of contribution). Now we ask: do these equilibria emerge endogenously between social
groups under circumstances of learning or cultural evolution? And: in such scenarios,
how likely is it that we see inequity emerge?
3 The Emergence of Inequity
In the models we focus on now, as mentioned above, populations are divided into two
groups that are identical modulo some arbitrary marker. We assume that actors can play
produce and partition with all members of the population, and that they condition their
strategies on the marker of their opponent. In other words, they choose a (Contribution,
Demand) combination based on what sort of individual they interact with. The stable
group level equilibria of this model will involve three conventions: one for interaction
within group A, one for interaction within group B, and one for interaction between
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the two groups. Since we are interested in the emergence of inequitable conventions
between those in different social categories, we will focus here on the between-group
equilibria. These are exactly those equilibria described in the last section, but extended
to an entire group. In this model, (Shirk,H)/(Toil,L) would correspond to a scenario
where, for example, whenever women and men form a household women contribute
more labor than men, and reap less reward. This tells us that, at the very least, the
sorts of inequitable patterns described in the introduction are plausible, stable social
conventions.
While the Nash equilibrium solution concept is one of the hallmarks of classical
game theory, it is deficient in that is does not specify how these equilibria are reached.
In addition, while some games like the ubiquitous prisoner’s dilemma have exactly one
Nash equilibrium, others may have several. Ours, in fact, has nine (of five different
types). Even if we observe that the populations will always converge to the set of Nash
equilibria under some dynamic, this says nothing about which of these outcomes are
more or less likely to be realized.
In order to develop a model for the emergence of equity/inequity, then, we look to
evolutionary game theory. This branch of modeling was originally developed to capture
the evolution of competitive behavior in animals (Maynard-Smith and Price, 1973), but it
has since found applications in the social sciences to study cultural evolution in humans.
Agents in these models play a game repeatedly and update their strategy over time
based on past success. This gives us a compelling story for how agents might actually
move towards equilibria and gives the equilibrium selection problem some tractability.
We will use this methodology to estimate which of our equilibria are likely to be reached.
Imagine our two populations locked in repeated play of produce and partition. Since,
as mentioned, we focus on between-group interactions, suppose that during every round,
each agent from the first population is randomly paired with an agent from the second to
play the game once. For those familiar with evolutionary game theory, this is a standard
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two-population model. After each round, players in population 1 look around to see how
the rest of the agents in their group did. Players who did worse than average will imitate
the strategies of players who performed well in the previous round. This imitation is
done in proportion to relative success, i.e., players who perform well below average are
more likely to abandon their strategy and players who perform well above average are
more likely to be copied. Players use their new strategies in the next round, and the
process repeats. These are the fundamental updating rules for the discrete time replica-
tor dynamics, the most common evolutionary dynamics employed in evolutionary game
theory. Strategies that perform above average proliferate, while those that underachieve
are gradually abandoned. While this is almost certainly an oversimplification of how
strategy updating actually occurs in human groups, the replicator dynamics provide a
plausible and computationally simple learning rule that represents some realistic aspects
of human cultural change.13
One important quality of the replicator dynamics is that they are deterministic. This
essentially means that there is no randomness to the dynamics. One can repeatedly
start the populations in strategy distribution state p and the replicator dynamics will
always carry the system to the same Nash equilibrium.14 One method of estimating
the frequency with which each equilibrium is realized, then, is to initialize our two
populations repeatedly with random proportions of strategies.15 Recording the end
point at which the players arrive each time gives us an estimate of the basins of attraction
for each equilibrium: the probability that players will settle on this convention in the
13Weibull (1997) shows that the replicator dynamics can be used to model cultural change via differen-
tial imitation of successful group members. This is because they are the mean field dynamics of explicit
imitation learning dynamics. Lancy (1996); Fiske (1999); Henrich and Gil-White (2001); Henrich and
Henrich (2007); Richerson and Boyd (2008) provide evidence that this sort of imitation occurs in real
human societies.
14Unless the dynamics never settle at an equilibrium, but this type of outcome is beyond the purview
of this paper.
15For the purposes of this paper, strategies are initially chosen with uniform probability over the
nine previously identified. There is nothing special about this choice, however, and there may in some
cases be grounds to assume some other probability distribution over initial strategy selection. A future
study might investigate the potential effects of outgroup bias on equity, for instance, by increasing the
probability of demanding high initially.
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Table 1: Basins of attraction for produce and partition
Equilibrium Work,M/Work,M
Work,L/
Work, H
Shirk,H/
Toil,L
Shirk,M/
Toil,M
Shirk, L/
Toil,H
Basin of 
attraction 20.00% 16.64% 18.55% 33.43% 11.38%
long run given random starting places. Since there are many (in fact infinite) potential
strategy initializations, we simulate a random sample of 108 strategy initializations and
record the basins of attraction in table 1.16 We collapse the nine possible equilibria into
their five types.
Two major results can be gleamed from this table. Perhaps most immediately, the
basin of attraction percentages sum to 100%, meaning that all simulations eventually
approached one of the Nash equilibria. While not entirely unexpected, this result is
important because it suggests that two social classes repeatedly given the opportunity
to produce some shared joint good will almost always converge to some convention that
allows them to do so. In the long run, one group will come to uniformly contribute a set
amount and demand a set amount, as will the other group. Unilateral deviation from
this arrangement will only lead to a lower payoff, so such conventions are generally hard
to leave.17
The other notable result is the ubiquity of unequal and inequitable outcomes. As
noted in section two, (Work,M)/(Work,M) is the only convention where all players
put forth equal effort and reap equal rewards. The probability of arriving at this
outcome is estimated at 20.00%, meaning that work and pay are not equally split in
80.00% of cases. What about equitability? Nash equilibria (Work,M)/(Work,M) and
(Shirk,L)/(Toil,H) are the only perfectly equitable outcomes and have combined basins
16All simulations were run in Eclipse, a Java based IDE. Code for this model is available online at
https://github.com/llamajones24/Inequity-sims.
17The Nash equilibria of the game in figure 2 are strict, meaning that an individual player who deviates
from equilibrium is guaranteed a lower payoff (provided no other players deviate). This also makes each
equilibrium an evolutionarily stable strategy profile and thus asymptotically stable under the replicator
dynamics (Accinelli and Carrera, 2008). This means that states very near the Nash equilibria are drawn
to them.
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of attraction of 31.38%. Inequitable outcomes, then, emerge in over two-thirds of all runs
and can be further broken into somewhat inequitable outcomes (Work,L)/(Work,H) and
(Shirk,M)/(Toil,M) occurring 50.07% of the time and the extremely inequitable outcome
(Shirk,H)/(Toil,L) emerging in 18.55% of trials. Overall these results suggest that in-
equity is not only possible but is in fact quite likely to emerge endogenously between
two social groups interacting over time.
The payoffs used in this game are not, of course, unique. Utilities may be tailored to
the particular joint project. Depending on the payoffs, it may not be worthwhile for an
individual to toil if they expect Low compensation. Our current payoff table does not
fully capture this situation. Consider instead the payoffs in figure 3.
Shirk, L Shirk, M Shirk, H Work, L Work, M Work, H Toil, L Toil, M Toil, H
5, 5 5, 5 5, 5 5, 3 5, 3 5, 3 8, 4 8, 6 8, 8
5, 5 5, 5 5, 5 5, 3 5, 3 5, 3 10, 4 10, 6 5, 1
5, 5 5, 5 5, 5 5, 3 5, 3 5, 3 12, 4 5, 1 5, 1
3, 5 3, 5 3, 5 6, 6 6, 8 6, 10 6, 4 6, 6 6, 8
3, 5 3, 5 3, 5 8, 6 8, 8 3, 3 8, 4 8, 6 3, 1
3, 5 3, 5 3, 5 10, 6 3, 3 3, 3 10, 4 3, 1 3, 1
4, 8 4, 10 4, 12 4, 6 4, 8 4, 10 4, 4 4, 6 4, 8
6, 8 6, 10 1, 5 6, 6 6, 8 1, 3 6, 4 6, 6 1, 1
Shirk, L
Shirk, M
Shirk, H
Work, L
Work, M
Work, H
Toil, L
Toil, M
8, 8 1, 5 1, 5 8, 6 1, 3 1, 3 8, 4 1, 1 1, 1Toil, H
Player 2
Player 1
Figure 3: Produce and partition with modified payoffs
In this new payoff table, payoffs for contributions are 5, 3, and 1 for Shirk, Work,
and Toil investments, respectively. Similarly, 3, 5 and 7 are the available demands for
resource produced. While this game retains most of the Nash equilibria from the first
edition, it loses (Shirk,H)/(Toil,L), since (Toil,L) is a dominated strategy. (One can al-
ways earn higher by playing (Shirk,H).) A new equilibrium arises at (Shirk,H)/(Shirk,H),
where agents from both populations invest very little into the project, which is never
completed.18 Given that (Shirk,H)/(Toil,L) was the most inequitable outcome and is
18While (Shirk,H)/(Shirk,H) is a pure Nash equilibrium, it is not a strict one, meaning that each
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Table 2: Basins of attraction for produce and partition with modified payoffs
Equilibrium Work,M/Work,M
Work,L/
Work, H
Basin of 
attraction 9.05% 4.42%
Predominantly 
Shirk,H/Shirk,H
11.89%
Shirk,M/
Toil,M
Shirk, L/
Toil,H
52.17% 22.47%
no longer a Nash equilibrium, one might expect the basins of attraction for inequitabil-
ity to shrink and equitability to become more likely. Inspection of table 2 reveals that
this is partially true. While the basin of attraction for inequitable outcomes has in-
deed decreased from 68.62% to 56.59%, the roughly 12% difference has been funnelled
not into the basin of attraction for equitability but instead into the non-cooperative
(Shirk,H)/(Shirk,H) equilibrium’s basin. The probability of ending up at an equitable
outcome remains at just above 31%. Despite modifications to the payoffs and the removal
of the least equitable solution, inequitability persists more often than not.
One might wonder whether there exist payoffs which consistently lead the populations
to an equitable equilibrium. While a complete sweep of the payoff space would be
impractical, we do simulate a variety of payoffs to test the robustness of our findings
under the replicator dynamics. In particular, we vary the worth of the produced good
relative to the cost of effort. As the value of the joint product increases (with fixed
effort costs), the basin of attraction for equity increases and the basin for inequity
decreases. The change is small, however, and inequity remains the more likely outcome.19
Unsurprisingly, less valuable joint goods typically lead to equilibria in which all players
shirk, preferring to slack off rather than produce something. We also investigate whether
the particular choices for partition demands might affect our results. We find that more
disparate high and low demands lead to slightly higher basins of attraction for equity.
actor can change strategies and get an equal payoff to their expected one. As a result, the system
seldom converges to two populations of (Shirk,H) players but rather results in two populations made
up predominantly of (Shirk,H) players with a scattering of (Shirk,L) and (Shirk,M) players. This is
sustainable because contributing Low, paired with any demand, is a best response to (Shirk,H). The
project is never completed and bargained over, so these strategies all earn the same payoff.
19Even when the joint good produced is extremely valuable (worth 400), the basin of attraction for
equity is only 44%.
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For instance, when the available demands are 10%, 50% and 90% of the joint good,
the basin of attraction for equity is 40%. In contrast, when possible demands are 45%,
50%, and 55% of the good, the probability of arriving at an equitable outcome is 28%.
This is in part because certain inequitable strategy pairs (e.g. Shirk,H/Toil,L) are not
Nash equilibria when partition demands are disparate, precluding them as realizable
conventions.20 We again find that the impact of varying these payoffs is minor. In all of
these simulations, the basin of attraction for equity never surpasses 44%. Thus, we have
reason to suspect that inequitable conventions are probable outcomes for a large range
of payoffs.
4 Inequity and Conditioned Demands
In the previous section we assumed that players select both their contribution level and
demand before ever encountering their opponent. Actors make the same demand re-
gardless of what their opponent contributes. In many cases, however, actors in real life
choose demands for compensation based in part on an interactive partner’s contribu-
tion. Imagine that two college roommates Amy and Brenda love throwing parties at
their apartment. In addition, the apartment must be at a minimal level of cleanliness
for any parties to be thrown. Both women refraining from cleaning will result in a filthy,
uninhabitable apartment. If Amy spends the week scrubbing the house furiously while
Brenda slacks off and plays video games, Amy may feel more deserving and might re-
quest that she get to use the apartment to party that weekend (a high demand). How
might this sort of conditional demand framework affect the probability of reaching an
equitable convention? Do actors resolve to reward those who work hard, conforming to
our intuitions about equitability? Or is inequity robust across these models?
20In addition, other authors note a similar pattern for evolution in the Nash demand game (O’Connor,
2017b). There are fewer states where populations move towards low demands when those demands are
very low.
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Table 3: Basins of attraction for conditional produce and partition
Equilibrium Work,M/Work,M
Work,L/
Work, H
Shirk,H/
Toil,L
Shirk,M/
Toil,M
Shirk, L/
Toil,H
Basin of 
attraction 31.44% 4.33% 5.83% 46.19% 2.97%
A major difference in this conditional strategy framework is that player strategies
have four parts: (Contribution, Demand vs Shirking opponent, Demand vs Working op-
ponent, Demand vs Toiling opponent). A player using strategy (Shirk, M, L, H) would
Shirk, demand Medium if her opponent Shirks, demand Low if her opponent Works, and
demand High if her opponent Toils. There are a total of 34 = 81 distinct strategies of
this form, so we omit the payoff matrix here. Using the original contribution payoffs (6,
5, 4) and demands (4, 5, 6), one might expect that the increase in strategies will lead
to an increase in Nash equilibria. While this is true, most of the equilibria are equiva-
lent to one of the original five from section 3: (Shirk,M)/(Toil,M), (Shirk,L)/(Toil,H),
(Shirk,H)/(Toil,L), (Work,L)/(Work,H), and (Work,M)/(Work,M).21
Inspecting the basins of attraction for the conditional produce and partition in table
3 yields two final results. The first is that inequitable outcomes still occur with high
probability (56.35%). This phenomenon has manifested itself throughout all variations
of produce and partition considered in this paper. The other result is that the Nash
equilibria basins of attraction in table 3 only sum to about 91%. To illustrate what
happens the other 9% of the time, imagine an employee and employer running a small
business. Both must put forward some minimum amount of effort at work for the business
to stay afloat. An employee who invests the minimum amount of effort for the business
to succeed will walk home with their promised paycheck. An employee who goes above
21Consider two strategies (Work, L, L, L) and (Work, H, L, H) composing population 1, while pop-
ulation 2 plays (Work, L, H, M) uniformly. Although the strategies (Work, L, L, L) and (Work, H,
L, H) in population 1 are technically distinct based on their demands, observe that both strategies
implement contribution level “work” and both of them only ever demand low, since their population 2
opponents uniformly contribute medium. This state looks like equilibrium (Work,L)/(Work,H), though
it is composed of many technically distinct strategies.
17
and beyond to excel at her tasks may warrant a bonus from the employer who hopes to
incentivize the employee’s good work (and not lose the employee to another company).
This is the essence of what occurs in these 9% of runs. One population is split
between two strategies: one investing smaller and demanding smaller, the other investing
larger and demanding larger. The second population discerns these discrepancies in
contribution and adjusts their demands for resources accordingly for each population 1
agent encountered. They always work, so that the good is produced, and then demand
less resource from harder workers and more from slackers. While these cases are relatively
rare, one might classify them as among the more equitable outcomes: greater effort is
being rewarded with greater spoils.
4.1 Agent Based Modeling and Robustness
To this point, we have explored only infinite population models where change is repre-
sented via the replicator dynamics. As we have pointed out, the replicator dynamics are
often used successfully as a model of cultural imitation. But there are other aspects of
human cultural change. We now briefly discuss results from a model that makes very
different assumptions about population size and dynamics. Of course, no model that is
simple enough to analyze will capture all the relevant ways that humans update their
strategic behavior. Instead, our goal is to provide a robustness check on our results.
We do this by altering a number of features of the model, but still maintaining the key
elements meant to correspond to our target systems. If we see similar results emerge,
we gain confidence that our results are not a relic of our modeling choices.
In particular, we simulate agent-based models with finite populations. The paradigm
we use is adapted from one employed by Young (1993b) to study the evolution of bar-
gaining between groups, and developed by Axtell et al. (2000) to explore the emergence
of inequitable conventions. Since then, it has been used by several authors to explore
the emergence of inequity and inequality (Gallo, 2014; O’Connor, 2017a; LaCroix and
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O’Connor, 2018). Our version of this model assumes that each round one agent is chosen
from each group to play the produce and partition game. Each agent has a finite string
of memories of past play by opponents.22 They use these memories to choose strate-
gies. In particular, each agent chooses whatever strategy would yield the highest payoff
on average if played against their memories, or best responds to their memories. This
is a boundedly-rational response rule. Agents make calculations about what strategy
will work best, on the assumption that their memories reflect the true distribution of
opponent strategies. This is arguably more cognitively complex than simply imitating
successful group members. But agents do not have infinite memories, and neither do
they make complicated inferences about how their opponents might behave.23
Because our agents play a produce and partition game, we actually model them as
having four strings of memories. The first corresponds to memories about past produc-
tion strategies of opponents. The next three correspond to conditional memories about
what partition demands opponents made after contributing some amount to production.
Strategy choices are made by first calculating a best response for production.24 Then, if
agents contribute enough to produce the resource, they consult their conditional memo-
ries of how agents made partition demands based on their production contributions, and
best respond.
This model has a few parameters. The first is group size, and the second memory
length (we assume equal memory length for each of the four strings). The last parameters
we can vary are the particular levels of contribution and demand in the two stages of the
game. Simulations of these models end up at the same, stable equilibria that simulations
of the replicator dynamics do. As with our previous models, we find that all five equilibria
22We start agents with no memories, and have them select their first memory randomly.
23This version of the learning rule is the one employed by Axtell et al. (2000), with the small variation
that we start with no memories rather than random strings. Young (1993b), on the other hand, considers
a group of agents who share recent memories and best respond to a random sample of these memories.
24In order to make this simple, we constrain payoffs so that it is always worthwhile for agents to
produce the resource. This means that they do not have to take the partition stage into account in
calculating best responses.
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Table 4: Outcomes for an agent based model of conditional produce and partition
Equilibrium Work,M/Work,M
Work,L/
Work, H
Shirk,H/
Toil,L
Shirk,M/
Toil,M
Shirk, L/
Toil,H
Basin of 
attraction 34.44% 22.87% 3.59% 22.02% 17.08%
arise with significant probability. To give an example, table 4 shows the likelihood of
each equilibrium for a population of size 10, memory length 10, and both contribution
payoffs and demands of 4, 5, and 6.25 Equitability emerges in 51% of simulations, and
inequitable outcomes the rest of the time.
Varying the parameters influences the probability that each outcome emerges. In
particular, increasing the size of the population makes the Work,M/Work,M outcome
increasingly likely. Smaller populations are more likely to end up at inequitable, and
unequal, outcomes. Making the Low and High demands of the partition game more
disparate increases the likelihood of outcomes where actors partition fairly.26 But, in
general, across parameter values, we again find that the probability of inequity emerging
in this model is always high, even though actors condition demands on the production
inputs of their partners.
5 Conclusion
One might wonder at this point: given the robustness with which inequitable conventions
of various sorts emerge in these simple models, how do we explain the prevalence of equity
norms? Remember that the models we have considered always involve a population
divided into two groups or social categories. Things turn out differently in a group
without these sorts of divisions.27 If we consider a single population, the symmetric,
25Code for this model is available online at https://github.com/cailinmeister/inequityinequality. We
ran simulations for population sizes 4-50, and memory length 10-15 to check robustness.
26We did not make the demands more disparate for the production game to avoid cases where actors
were not always incentivized to produce, as noted.
27By this we simply mean a one population model.
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equitable outcome (Work,M)/(Work,M) emerges 60% of the time. Another 27.4% of the
time, all agents end up demanding medium in the end, and some shirk while others toil.
The rest of the time, a number of equilibria emerge that involve a mixture of shirkers and
toilers, and different demands. Notice that at these equilibria, though, despite the fact
that individual interactions will be inequitable, it is nonetheless the case that all actors
have the same expected payoffs. Otherwise, of course, they would not be equilibria in a
single population.
Why does the simple addition or subtraction of categories from the model so radically
alter the cultural evolution that occurs? One way to explain it appeals to symmetry
and symmetry breaking. In the contribution part of the model, actors are most efficient
if they perfectly divide the labor. (I.e., no extra work is done to produce the good, and
the opportunity to create a joint surplus is taken advantage of.) In a population without
categories, the only way to guarantee that every pairing of actors will efficiently divide
labor is for everyone to choose contribution level “work”. Otherwise, sometimes shirkers
will meet each other and fail to produce the good, and sometimes toilers will meet each
other and put too much work into the project. With categories, actors can use category
membership as a symmetry-breaking mechanism. There is an extra piece of information
in interactions between those in different categories (i.e., I am type A and you are type
B), which allows them to efficiently break symmetry with respect to contributions (type
A always contributes more, type B less).28
This same sort of reasoning applies to bargaining over rewards from joint labor.
With one exception—when it comes to this stage of the process, information about
earlier contributions can be used as a symmetry breaker. But, of course, a dependence
28See O’Connor (2017b) for an in-depth discussion of this sort of symmetry breaking. Similar reasoning
can be applied to work in philosophy of science explaining the emergence of fairness norms. Skyrms
(1994); Alexander and Skyrms (1999); Skyrms (2014); Alexander (2007) show that in simplified Nash
demand games the equal outcome is special from an evolutionary point of view. Because it is the only
symmetric outcome, it is more likely to evolve. In contrast, when Axtell et al. (2000); Bruner (2017);
Bruner and O’Connor (2015); O’Connor and Bruner (2017); Rubin and O’Connor (2017) add categories
to the same sort of model, the fairness norm is no longer special because the categories break symmetry
between actors of different types.
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between contribution and reward is what we expect from an equitable convention.29
When we have two different categories of actors, there is a symmetry breaker available
at the reward stage that has nothing to do with contribution. In other words, once we
get to the second stage, there is no particular reason to coordinate reward based on
contribution compared to coordinating reward based on irrelevant group membership.
This is perhaps the central insight of the paper. From a standpoint where we think
of conventions and norms as facilitating social coordination, equity is special in groups
where everyone is the same, but its specialness disappears as soon as any sort of further
social information in the form of social category membership is added. What we see
here is that it is quite easy to evolve conventions that do not involve equitable divisions
of jointly produced social resources if we have groups divided into categories.
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